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In this paper, we draw on the Hansen (1999) threshold regression model to examine the empirical links between 
leverage and firm performance by means of a new threshold variable, firm size. We ask whether there exists an 
optimal firm size for which leverage is not negatively related to firm performance. Accordingly, with a panel data 
of 101 listed firms in Nigeria between 2003 and 2007, we explore whether the ultimate effect of leverage on firm 
performance is contingent on firm size; that is, whether the type of impact that leverage has on the performance 
of a firm is dependent on the size of the firm. Our results show that the negative effect of leverage on firm 
performance is most eminent and significant for small-sized firms and that the evidence of a negative effect 
diminishes as a firm grows, eventually vanishing when firm size exceeds its estimated threshold level. We find 
that this result continues to hold, irrespective of the debt ratios utilized. In line with earlier studies, our results 
show WKDWWKHHIIHFWRIOHYHUDJHRQ7RELQ¶V4LVSRVLWLYHIRU1LJHULD¶VOLVWHGILUPV+RZHYHUour new finding is 
the evidence that the strength of the positive relationship depends on the size of the firm and is mostly higher for 
small-sized firms. 
   JEL Classification: C33; C12; C13; F21; F32; G32; L25 
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1. Introduction  
There is a widespread view that the impact of leverage on firm performance is ambiguous, with some studies 
finding a negative relationship (see Chen (2004), Tian and Zeitun (2007), and Salawu (2007)) and others reporting 
either a positive or no significant relationship (see Brick and Ravid (1985) and Azeez (2015)). Theoretically, the 
divergence in previous studies can be partly explained by competing theories such as the signalling theory which 
posits that debt, in the presence of asymmetric information, should be positively related to firm profit performance, 
and the agency costs or pecking order theory which predicts a negative relationship between leverage and firm 
performance resulting from the agency costs between firm owners and lenders. Empirically, one plausible 
explanation for this ambiguity, in our view, may be the failure of existing empirical studies to model the contingent 
role that the size of a firm plays in the relationship between leverage and firm performance. If firm size impacts 
firm performance and the relationship between leverage and firm performance remains a subject of discussion, 
then firm size should provide some explanation for the ambiguous relationship between leverage and firm 
performance. This is the hypothesis advanced in this paper and forms the basis on which our empirical analysis is 
built. To reiterate, we ask whether the size of a firm helps to better understand and explain the ambiguous 
relationship between leverage and firm performance that has been documented in previous studies. As a by-
product of this question, we determine whether there exists an optimal level of firm size at which leverage does 
not diminish firm performance. 
In addressing the main question posed in this paper, we employ the concept of threshold analysis, à la Hansen 
(1999) which is most suitable when nonlinearities between financial variables are to be explored. The concept of 
threshold regression modelling has a wide variety of applications in economics and finance. Our motivation to 
draw on the framework of threshold analysis stems from our main objective ± we wish to determine whether the 
relationship between leverage and firm performance depends on firm size. That is, whether size is an advantage 
for firms and whether large-sized firms in Nigeria are better able to reap the benefits of leverage than their smaller 
counterparts. We have focused on Nigeria¶VOLVWHGILUPV because several studies (see Akinlo and Asaolu (2012), 
Patrick and Ogebe (2013), Olokoyo (2013), Jeleel and Olayiwola (2017), among others) have mostly concluded 
that debt is generally bad for firms in the real sectors as it is responsible for the weakening firm performance that 
has been observed across these firms over the years. This has led many listed firms across the different real sectors 
RI 1LJHULD¶V economy to favour corporate governance policies and business strategies that promote less debt 
relative to other funding sources. The danger with such policies in a frontier emerging market such as Nigeria is 
that it stifles the opportunity for organic growth of firms, especially in the likely instances where other funding 
sources are either very limited or completely absent. 
Furthermore, these studies on the leverage-performance nexus in Nigeria have an important drawback. They did 
not consider the contingent role that other factors such as firm size might play in the leverage-performance nexus, 
and little is known about whether the size of a firm could be a game changer regarding the empirical relationship 
between leverage and firm performance. It is this specific issue that we set out to address in this paper. Moreover, 
1LJHULD¶VOLVWHGILUPVDUHDVSHFLDOFDVHLQWKDWWKHGHEWFRPSRQHQWRIWKHLUcapital structure relies on short-term 
debt and has a low amount of long-term debt (Nwankwo, 2014), partly due to the nonexistence of a robust debt 
capital market in the country. Thus, a study that examines the impact of leverage, particularly short-term leverage, 
on firm performance is crucial in this instance as it will uncover the consequences of the preference for such form 
of leverage and reveal conditions for it to be less or more deleterious to firm performance. 
To address the problem, we will test whether the relationship between leverage and firm size is invariant to sample 
splitting, where the sample is split based on firm size and where the firm size represents the threshold variable. 
We do not impose a predetermined estimate of firm size; instead we follow the procedure in Hansen (1999) which 
determines, from available data, estimates of thresholds based on minimizing the concentrated sum of squares. If 
we find evidence that such a split yields relationship between leverage and firm performance that is different 
across the split samples, then this would be an evidence for nonlinearities between leverage and firm performance, 
where the nonlinear agent is the firm size ± that is, firm size influences the link between leverage and firm 
performance, so that there exists DOHYHORUµcut-off SRLQW¶IRU firm size such that the relationship between leverage 
and firm performance changes. For instance, it could be that leverage decelerates firm performance when firm 
size is below a certain level, say x, but accelerates firm performance when firm size is above x. On the other hand, 
it could also be that whether firm size is above or below x, the link between leverage and firm performance is 
unchanged, i.e. leverage either accelerates or decelerates firm performance irrespective of firm size. The 
advantage of this empirical exercise is that it provides a fresh perspective among researchers, policymakers and 
business managers that promotes the monitoring of not just leverage and how it affects performance but also how 
firm size might, positively or negatively, influence this relationship. One important consequence of this paper is 
its potential to inspire a tradition where firms take size into consideration before reaching a decision on the amount 
of debt to include on their balance sheets in a bid to unlock the positive benefits or at least mitigate the negative 
effects of leverage on performance.  
Utilizing a panel of 101 firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange from 2003 - 2007, we find compelling 
evidence of a difference in the impact of leverage on firm performance for different firm sizes. Specifically, our 
results show that the negative effects of leverage on ROA and ROE (accounting measures of firm performance) 
are evident and significant only when firm size is small, falling below its estimated threshold level. Beyond this 
level, leverage has no significant negative impact on firm performance. This seems to suggest that the much-
emphasized demerits of leverage, such as exposure to greater financial distress which dampens firm performance, 
are more of a concern for small firms and possibly of less concern for large firms. Thus, the agency costs theory, 
which suggests that debt affects firm performance negatively, appears to be supported for the small size firms 
while the signalling theory, which posits that leverage is positively related to firm performance, garners no 
support. We also find that leverage is positively related to 7RELQ¶V4a measure of firm (market) performance, 
and that the strength of the positive association depends on firm size and is mostly higher for small-sized firms. 
These results are robust to different measures of leverage, the inclusion of other determinants of firm performance 
such as taxes and firm age to control for tax effects and the prolonged existence of firms.  
To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has addressed the problem of determining the impact of leverage 
on firm performance under the threshold framework, with firm size as a threshold variable. The few related studies 
such as Cheng et al. (2010), Lin and Chang (2011), Cuong and Canh (2012a, b), among others, utilize leverage as 
a threshold variable to determine the optimal level of debt after which firm value, performance or productivity 
begins to drag. Instead, in this paper, we look at the impact of leverage on firm performance for firms of different 
sizes. Therefore, our paper provides a new contribution to the literature. The advantage of our empirical approach, 
the threshold framework, is that it enables us to investigate the contingent roles that other performance 
determinants such as firm size play in the leverage-performance nexus and to take advantage of the nonlinearities 
inherent in the relationship between leverage and firm performance which previous studies have mostly ignored. 
Most previous studies on the relationship between leverage and firm performance assume that leverage and firm 
performance bear a linear or monotonic relationship so that the effect of leverage on firm performance is 
qualitatively the same for all determinants of firm performance. In this paper, and using firm size, we show that 
this does not necessarily hold. Instead, we argue that the size of a firm plays a crucial contingent role in the type 
of relationship between leverage and firm performance. The rationale for including firm size as a threshold 
variable stems from the evidence of an empirical relationship between firm size and firm performance documented 
in the literature. 
In all, our paper finds that the relationship between leverage and firm performance depends on the size of a firm 
and that the performance of small-sized firms is negatively affected by an increase in leverage while no such 
evidence exists for large firms. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a detailed 
literature review while Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical methodology; it briefly 
motivates the rationale for a threshold empirical analysis, and explains the methodology of the threshold model. 
Section 5 discusses the empirical results while Section 6 presents a summary and implication of results. The last 
section concludes, with pointers to possible future research extensions. 
2. Literature Review 
Since this study aims to empirically investigate the relationship between leverage and firm performance, our 
review of the literature will focus on studies around this domain. Several previous empirical studies have 
examined the relationship between leverage and firm performance. The findings from these studies are, at best, 
mixed. On the one hand, some studies such as Abor (2005), Ruland and Zhou (2005), Robb and Robinson (2009), 
Chandrakumarmangalam and Govindasamy (2010) find positive relationships between leverage and firm 
performance. In fact, Robb and Robinson (2009) argue that gains from leverage are significant, and the use of 
debt enhances firm performance because the returns earned are greater than the average interest expense incurred 
on leverage. Their outcome can be explained in the context of previous influential studies such as Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) and Jensen (1986) who argue that profitable firms signal quality by leveraging up, resulting in a 
positive relation between leverage and profitability. A few others such as Fama and French (1998), Negash (2001), 
Myers (2001) and Phillips and Sipahioglu (2004) have identified a negative impact of leverage on firm 
performance while others like Long and Malitz (1986), Hall et al. (2000) and Amjed (2007) find no significant 
relationship between leverage and firm performance. Fama and French (1998) argue that the degree of leverage 
generates agency problems that predict a negative relationship between leverage and profit performance. 
Among the few that have employed the concept of thresholds, Cheng et al. (2010), using leverage as a threshold 
variable, suggest that more leverage increases firm performance up to a certain point and then firm performance 
starts to decrease. Lin and Chang (2011) also using debt as a threshold, find that for Taiwanese listed companies, 
there are two threshold effects between leverage and firm performance. When the debt ratio is low, then firm 
SHUIRUPDQFHSUR[LHGE\7RELQ¶V4LQFUHDVHVIROORZLQJDQLQFUHDVHLQOHYHUDJH:KHQWKHOHYHUDJHLVKigh, there 
is no evidence of a relationship between leverage and firm performance. A similar threshold-based study on 
selected Vietnamese firms by Cuong and Canh (2012) uses debt ratio as a threshold, as in earlier studies, and 
examines the relationship between leverage and ROE, their measure of firm performance. They find that there 
exists a double threshold effect between leverage and firm performance such that if debt level is in the low 
threshold regime, it promotes firm performance but if in the high threshold regime, it dampens firm performance. 
Taken together, these studies suggest that there are threshold effects in the relationship between leverage and firm 
performance. However, their focus is on the threshold effect of leverage on the leverage-performance nexus and 
little is known of the threshold effect of other firm performance determinants such as firm size on the leverage-
performance nexus. 
In the context of Nigeria and similar developing countries, several studies have looked at the relationship between 
leverage and firm performance and between firm size and firm performance. Onaolapo and Kajola (2010) 
investigate WKHLPSDFWRIFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHRQWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRI1LJHULD¶VOLVWHGILUPVIRFXVLQJRQWKHUHDOVHFWRU. 
They find that high debt ratio has a significant negative effect on firm performance such as return on assets and 
return on equity and therefore their results are in support of the agency costs WKHRU\¶V SRVLWLRQ Using profit 
efficiency of banks as an indicator for agency costs and the equity ratio of banks as an indicator for leverage, 
Pratomo and Ismail (2006) examine the impact of capital structure on performance in Malaysia. Their findings 
were also consistent with the agency hypothesis. Oke and Afolabi (2011) examine the impact of capital structure 
on industrial performance in Nigeria using debt financing as a proxy for capital structure and profit efficiency as 
a proxy for firm performance. Their results, which echo previous findings, show a negative relationship between 
debt financing and performance. Pratheepkanth (2011) studies the capital structure and financial performance of 
6UL/DQND¶VOLVWHGcompanies, proxying capital structure with debt and firm performance with return on capital 
employed (ROCE) and return on assets (ROA). The results show that the relationship between leverage and 
performance is negative so that an increase in debt weakens performance of firms. On the size and performance 
nexus, Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008), Azeez (2015) and Olokoyo (2013), among others, show that firm size is 
positively related to firm performance as larger firms are better able to optimally utilize economies of scale. On 
the contrary, Klapper and Love (2004) find that larger companies may incur inefficiencies that result in poor 
performance. All these studies have one thing in common ± they employ linear empirical techniques and thus 
disregard the nonlinearities or threshold effects in the leverage-performance nexus. 
Indeed, the contingent role of firm size in the relationship between leverage and firm performance has been 
scarcely investigated. In the few instances where an attempt has been made, the empirical modelling strategy 
adopted is linear and imposes an a priori restriction that the effect of leverage on firm performance is congruent 
across all values of firm size. However, this assumption might be too restrictive as the relationship may be 
nonlinear and different firm sizes may well imply different relationships between leverage and firm performance. 
We seek to plug this gap in the literature by adopting a more flexible empirical specification that allows different 
possible relationships between leverage and firm performance for different firm sizes. Thus, in this paper, we 
adopt an intuitive approach to empirically model the effect of leverage on firm performance by examining the 
role of firm size in the relationship between leverage and firm performance. We utilize Hansen (1999) threshold 
regression model which is based on the concept of threshold effects. We draw on an important variable± firm size 
± to determine the extent to which it provides a new insight into the leverage-firm performance nexus. This enables 
us to determine appropriate levels of firm size at which leverage might either dampen or enhance firm 
performance.  
3. Data Samples 
This section describes the data employed for the empirical analysis. The data samples comprise different measures 
of leverage being total debt-to-asset ratio, long-term debt-to-asset ratio and short-term debt-to-asset ratio. Firm 
performance is represented by accounting performance measures (ROA and ROE) and market performance 
PHDVXUH7RELQ¶V4. We also include other variables such as firm size (the threshold variable), tax rate and firm 
age. The leverage variables are the independent variables of interest, while firm performance is the dependent 
variable. We utilize the same data samples as in Olokoyo (2013). The data samples have been sourced from the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) Factbook and the published annual reports of listed companies in Nigeria. The 
samples cover 101 non-financial firms from 26 subsectors for period 2003 ± 2007. 
 
 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The summary statistics are presented below. The overall mean ROA across the listed firms from 2003-2007 is 
ZKLOHIRU52(DQG7RELQ¶V4 LW LV and 93.32% respectively. ROA ranges from -602.08% to 
ZKLOH52(DQG7RELQ¶V4UDQJH from -69634% to 155861% and 8.71% to 716.84% respectively. The 
unusually large and volatile ROE, which is several times the average inflation rate of below 20% in the period, is 
driven by the high and volatile operating profit, operating efficiency and, to some extent, financial leverage that 
characterized the listed nonfinancial firms in Nigeria pre- 2007 recession. A cursory look at the data suggests that 
the supernormal ROE emanates from the few large cap corporations, many of which have medium to high levels 
of profit margins and are known to be operationally efficient and employ a sizable amount of financial leverage 
to expand ROE. In a related study, Olokoyo (2013) notes that the very high ROE may reflect the lower corporate 
tax rate imposed on listed firms in Nigeria. This lower tax rate drives higher margins, the result being a decent 
level of operating profit even in cost-burdened industries. 
Table 1.0: Summary Statistics 
Variables               Mean               Median          Std Dev. Minimum Maximum 
 
ROA 0.0804 0.0927 0.448 -6.0208 3.7104 
 
ROE 4.5907 0.707 77.3011 -696.34 1558.61 
 
TOB Q 0.9332 0.7038 0.9872 0.0871 7.1684 
 
TDTA 0.735 0.521 0.9195 0.0143 6.8064 
 
LTDTA 0.2757 0.1377 0.4704 0.000 6.5521 
 
STDTA 0.4592 0.2642 0.6930 0.000 5.5809 
 
SIZE 6.1719 6.3017 1.2999 0.000 8.1378 
 
Note: ROA is the return on assets (EBIT/ total assets), ROE is the return on equity (EBIT/ equity), Tob Q (Tobins Q) 
equals (Market value of equity + book value of debt)/ book value of assets; TDTA is the total debt divided/ total assets; 
LTDTA is the long-term debt / total assets; STDTA is the short-term debt/total assets; Size represented as log of 
turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). Leverage is TDTA, LTDTA or STDTA 
We note that the story is quite different for ROA which is more or less at normal levels and reflects the series of 
organic expansion drives that VRPHRI1LJHULD¶VPDMRUILUPVKDGHmbarked on. This stabilized the ROA as returns 
from capacity expansion have a lagged effect which materialized only after several years, post capacity expansion, 
when production got ramped up and plants began to work at higher capacities)LQDOO\7RELQ¶V4ZKLFKPHDVXUHV
the market performance of firms, averaged over 90% in the period under consideration and is less volatile. As the 
HVWLPDWLRQRI7RELQ¶V4LQYROYHVWKHPDUNHWYDlue of the listed firms, and given that most listed firms in Nigeria 
rallied significantly prior to the recession commencing in late 2007, it is realistic to posit WKDWWKHKLJK7RELQ¶V4
for the period reflects the significant wealth that listed firms created in the period, because of the frequent rally of 
share prices. 
Table 2: Cross Correlation Matrix 
          ROE            TOB        TDTA    LTDTA     STDTA     SIZE 
ROA 
      
ROE 1 
     
TOB Q -0.0688 1 
    
TDTA -0.0623 0.9663 1 
   
LTDTA -0.0584 0.6705 0.6781 1 
  
STDTA -0.0429 0.8271 0.8666 0.2209 1 
 
SIZE 0.0155 0.336 -0.2697 -0.2521 -0.1867 1 
Note: ROA is the return on assets (EBIT/ total assets), ROE is the return on equity (EBIT/ equity), Tob Q (Tobins Q) equals 
(Market value of equity + book value of debt)/ book value of assets; TDTA is the total debt divided/ total assets; LTDTA is 
the long-term debt / total assets; STDTA is the short-term debt/total assets; Size represented as log of turnover, Tax = total 
tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). Leverage is TDTA, LTDTA or STDTA 
 
Meanwhile, it is seen from Table 1.0 that the measures of leverage, total debt-total asset (TDTA), long-term debt-
total asset (LTDTA) and short-term debt-to-total asset (STDTA), have mean values of 73.5%, 27.6% and 45.9%. 
The figures reveal that for the firms in our sample, short-term debt is about twice as large as long-term debt, 
implying either short-term debt has been more accessible in relation to long-term debt and/or firms have had an 
elevated need to fund large deficits in working capital and thus resorted to employing short-term debt. Meanwhile, 
Table 2 shows the cross correlations among the selected variables, revealing that the magnitudes of most 
correlation coefficients are moderate. We analyse a cross-correlation matrix to obtain a preliminary view of the 
bivariate associations between variables in the study before a more formal empirical analysis or investigation is 
performed. The cross correlation also helps to objectively determine how much similarity there are between 
variables to ensure that we are including appropriate variables in the regression model and that multicollinearity 
is not a big issue in our empirical analysis. 
4. Empirical Methodology 
In this section, we first motivate the need for a threshold analysis and then we provide a brief description of the 
Hansen (1999) threshold regression model on which the empirical analysis presented in this paper is based. 
4.1 Why Threshold Analysis of the impact of leverage on firm performance? 
A weakness of existing empirical analysis, and a potential reason for the sometimes-ambiguous findings on the 
effects of leverage on firm performance, is the assumption of complete linearity of the regression models on which 
the findings are based. To be clear, most existing empirical strategies (see literature) impose an ex ante assumption 
that the relationship between leverage and firm performance is either increasing or decreasing 
monotonically/linearly with the regressors in the regression model, so that whenever high leverage implies either 
a decline or an increase in firm performanceǡthen this must be true for all values ofܥ ൏ ܿଵ and ܥ ൐ ܿଵwhereܥ is 
a member or subset of the vector containing the other regressors and ܿଵ, which is any real number, is a value of ܥ 
at some point in time. However, in general, this assumption is not always supported empirically. There are cases 
where, for instance, leverage weakens firm performance only for some ܥ, i.e. either for ܥ ൏ ܿଵ or ܥ ൐ ܿଵ, but not 
both, i.e. not for all ܥ ൐ ܿଵandܥ ൏ ܿଵ. This implies it is plausible to have a combination of high leverage and 
weakened firm performance for ܥ ൏ ܿଵ but then obtain either a combination of high leverage and improved firm 
performance or no evidence of a combination of high leverage and weakened firm performance forܥ ൐ ܿଵ or other 
possible combinations that connote different kinds of relationships between leverage and firm performance along 
the range of different values ofܥ. These are plausible scenarios which most empirical strategies employed in 
previous studies investigating the leverage-firm performance nexus fail to acknowledge. Accordingly, we draw 
on the threshold regression model, to address this concern.  
The threshold regression model is a nonlinear approach that allows for instances in which the relationships 
between two variables, say leverage and firm performance, can be different at some sections of the data. In this 
model, samples are split into regimes ܥ ൐ ܿଵ and ܥ ൏ ܿଵ for all values of leverage. This allows one to study the 
impact of leverage on firm performance by considering all possible scenarios. The variableܥ א ܸ, where ܸ is the 
vector of all possible regressors in the model, is called the threshold variable that divides samples into different 
regimes, while ܿଵ is the threshold value associated withܥ, whereܿଵ, which is usually estimated from data, is an 
element of the support ofܥ. This empirical framework provides a more generalized and flexible specification as 
it accommodates different kinds of relationships between leverage and firm performance for different levels of 
thresholds and allows for the study of the relationship between leverage and firm performance in a more holistic 
manner. We use firm size as the threshold variable as we aim to study how leverage weakens firm performance 
for different firm sizes. 
 
4.2 The Threshold Model 
The model has a dependent variable, focus regressor, threshold and control variables. The focus 
regressor in this paper, the regressor of interest, is the debt ratio (leverage) ± total debt-total asset 
(TDTA), long-term debt-total asset (LTDTA) and short-term debt-to-total asset (STDTA). In general, 
different forms of the model are possible. In this paper, we follow Hansen (1999) and consider the form 
in which the focus regressor, threshold and control variables are exogenous. The structural threshold 
regression model is given by 
 ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߚଵᇱݔ௜௧ܫሺݍ௜௧ ൑ ߛሻ ൅ ߚଶᇱ ݔ௜௧ܫሺݍ௜௧ ൐ ߛሻ ൅ ߥ௜௧ ǡሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
where ݒ௜௧ ൌ Ɋ௜ ൅ ݁௜௧ 
The observed data samples are drawn from a panelሼݕ௜௧ ǡ ݍ௜௧ ǡ ݔ௜௧ǣ  ? ൑ ݅ ൑ ݊ǡ  ? ൑ ݐ ൑ ܶሽ, where ݅ and ݐ 
represent firm and time indexes respectively, ݔ௜௧ is a set of regressors which contain the focus regressor 
while ݍ௜௧ is the threshold variable which can be a member of ݔ௜௧ and is assumed to follow a continuous 
distribution, Ɋ௜ FRQVWLWXWHVILUPV¶XQREVHUYHGWLPHLQYDULDQWIL[HGHIIHFWV 
The above structural equation can be written as ݕ௜௧ ൌ Ɋ௜ ൅ ߚଵᇱݔ௜௧ܫሺݍ௜௧ ൑ ߛሻ ൅ ߚଶᇱ ݔ௜௧ܫሺݍ௜௧ ൐ ߛሻ ൅ ݁௜௧ ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
where  ݕ௜௧ is a real-valued scalar variable, ݔ௜௧ is an ݉ ൈ  ? vector of regressors, ݍ௜௧ is a scalar threshold 
variable, with ܦ݅݉ሺݕ௜௧ሻ ൌ ܦ݅݉ሺݍ௜௧ሻ, ߛ is the unobserved threshold value which needs to be estimated, ߚଵᇱ  and ߚଶᇱ  are vectors of slope parameters associated with the different regimes ܣ ൌ ሼݍ௜௧ ȁሺݍ௜௧ ൑ ߛሻሽ 
and ܤ ൌ ሼݍ௜௧ ȁሺݍ௜௧ ൐ ߛሻሽ and ܫሺǤ ሻ is the indicator function defined for an arbitrary element ݀ in a set ܣ ׫ ܤ as  ܫሺ݀ሻ ൌ ቄ ?݀ א ܣ ׫ ܤ ?݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
where ܣ ൌ ሼݍ௜௧ ȁሺݍ௜௧ ൑ ߛሻሽ, ܤ ൌ ሼݍ௜௧ ȁሺݍ௜௧ ൐ ߛሻሽ and ܣ ת ܤ ൌ ׎ since ܣ and ܤ are disjoint. The 
vector of regressors ݔ௜௧ contains both the focus regressor and control variables, both of which are 
assumed exogenous. 
From above, two scenarios are possible, depending on whether ݀ א ሼݍ௜௧ ȁሺݍ௜௧ ൑ ߛሻሽ or݀ אሼݍ௜௧ȁሺݍ௜௧ ൐ ߛሻሽ. This yields the two different regimes as given below  
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ൝Ɋ௜ ൅ ߚଵᇱݔ௜௧ ൅ ݁௜௧ݍ௜௧ ൑ ߛɊ௜ ൅ ߚଶᇱ ݔ௜௧ ൅ ݁௜௧ݍ௜௧ ൐ ߛǤሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
An alternative representation of the model is obtained when both regimes are written compactly, so that 
the slope parameters are set in a row vector, while the regressors and thresholds are represented in a 
column vector, i.e. 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ Ɋ௜ ൅ ሺߚଵᇱ ǡ ߚଶᇱ ሻ ቌݔ௜௧ܫሺݍ௜௧ ൑ ߛሻݔ௜௧ܫሺݍ௜௧ ൐ ߛሻቍ ൅ ݁௜௧ ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ ݕ௜௧ ൌ Ɋ௜ ൅ ߚᇱݔ௜௧ሺߛሻ ൅ ݁௜௧ ǡሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ  
where ߚ ൌ ሺߚଵᇱ ǡ ߚଶᇱ ሻԢ and ݔ௜௧ሺߛሻ ൌ ൭ݔ݅ݐܫ൫ݍ݅ݐ൑ߛ൯ݔ݅ݐܫ൫ݍ݅ݐ൐ߛ൯൱. 
The observations from the data samples are divided into regimes ± 1) when the threshold variable is at 
most its threshold value, i.e. ݍ௜௧ ൑ ߛ, and 2) when the threshold variable is above its threshold value, 
i.e. ݍ௜௧ ൐ ߛ. The slopes ߚଵᇱ andߚଶᇱ  associated with 1 and 2 are then estimated. For identification of ߚଵᇱ andߚଶᇱ , both ݔ௜௧ and ݍ௜௧ cannot be time invariant. 
Notice that the error component ߥ௜௧ has been split into two partsݒ௜௧ ൌ Ɋ௜ ൅ ݁௜௧, where݁௜௧ is assumed to 
be an independent and identically distributed (iid) zero mean idiosyncratic random disturbance with 
constant and finite variance ߪଶ i.e. ݁ ௜௧ ӱ݅݅݀ܰሺ ?ǡ ߪଶሻ. The iid assumption requires that the regressors ݔ௜௧ 
and threshold variable ݍ௜௧ exclude endogenous variables, which can correlate with the error term. Thus, ݁௜௧is a martingale difference sequence ሼ݁௜௧ǡ ࣠௧ሽ on the probability space ሺߗǡ ࣠ǡ Զሻ for each ݅ since  ॱሺ݁௜௧ሻ ൌ  ? ൏  ? and ॱሺ݁௜௧ȁ࣠௧ିଵሻ ൌ  ?, where ࣠௧ is a natural filtration at timeݐ. Similarly, ॱሺ݁௜௧ȁݍ௜௧ሻ ൌ ॱሺ݁௜௧ȁݔ௜௧ሻ ൌ  ? and ሺݔ௜௧ ǡ ݍ௜௧ሻ are measurable with respect to࣠௧ିଵ, i.e. ሺݔ௜௧ ǡ ݍ௜௧ሻ א ࣠௧ିଵ, 
where ࣠௧ିଵ is the sigma field generated by Յ ൌ ൛ݔሺ௜ି௝ሻ௧ ǡ ݍሺ௜ି௝ሻ௧ ǡ ݁ሺ௜ିଵି௝ሻ௧ǣ݆ ൒  ?ൟ. These assumptions 
ensure results from the model cannot be extended to models with endogenous regressors and/or 
heteroscedastic and serially correlated errors.  
4.2.1 Estimating the Model 
In estimating the above model, the first step is to eliminate firm specific effects, Ɋ௜. Since the panel is 
balanced, we follow Hansen (1999) and eliminate Ɋ௜ using the within transformation wherein 
contemporaneous observations are subtracted from the within group average for each variable. This 
transformation yields an idempotent matrix of the transformed error terms which in turn ensures that 
the distributional assumption of the original threshold model is preserved and serial correlation is 
avoided.  
The within transformation of (1.1) yields 
 ݕ௜௧ၧ ൌ ߚᇱݔ௜௧ၧሺߛሻ ൅ ݁௜௧ၧ ǡሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
where  
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Let  ݕ௜ၧ ൌ ൭௬�?�?ၧǤǤǤ௬�?�?ၧ ൱ǡݔ௜ၧሺߛሻ ൌ ൭௫�?�?ၧ ሺ�?ሻᇱǤǤǤ௫�?�?ၧ ሺ�?ሻᇱ൱ǡ݁௜ၧ ൌ ൭௘�?�?ၧǤǤǤ௘�?�?ၧ ൱ሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ  
denote the stacked data and errors associated with firm݅, with one-time period deleted as in Hansen (1999). 

























ǡሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
then the threshold regression model in terms of the stacked data is equivalent to ܻၧ ൌ ܺၧሺߛሻߚ ൅ ݁ၧǤሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
The transformed equation preserves all assumptions made in the original structural equation. Thus, for 
anyߛ, the slope parameter ߚ can be estimated by least squares, giving ߚመሺߛሻ ൌ ൫ܺၧሺߛሻԢܺၧሺߛሻ൯ିଵܺၧሺߛሻᇱܻၧሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
Once estimated, the vector of regression residuals is obtained from the threshold dependent slope 
parameter as ෝ݁ၧሺߛሻ ൌ ܻၧ െ ܺၧሺߛሻߚመሺߛሻ ൌ ܻၧ െ ܺၧሺߛሻ൫ܺၧሺߛሻԢܺၧሺߛሻ൯ିଵܺၧሺߛሻᇱܻၧ).                                  (1.14)  
The regression residual is then used to compute the sum of squared errors as ܵଵሺߛሻ ൌ݁ၧෞሺߛሻᇱ݁ၧෞሺߛሻwhereܵଵሺߛሻ ൌ ܻၧ ቀܫ െ ܺၧሺߛሻᇱ൫ܺၧሺߛሻᇱܺၧሺߛሻ൯ିଵܺၧሺߛሻᇱቁ ܻၧǤ Since the threshold 
variables are each exogenous, the threshold value ߛ, which determines the sample split, can be estimated 
by least squares in line with Hansen (1999). This implies finding ߛthat minimizes the concentrated sum 
of squared errors, so that the least squares estimator of ߛ  is ߛො ൌ �? ܵଵሺߛሻ 1. 
After ߛො is obtained, the slope parameter estimate is ߚመ ൌ ߚመሺߛොሻ. It is important to note that ߚመሺߛොሻ represents 
the slope parameters computed at the different regimes partitioned byߛො. Thus, the vector of slopes 
associated with the regimes ܫሺݍ௜௧ ൑ ߛොሻ and ܫሺݍ௜௧ ൐ ߛොሻ are given by ߚଵ෢ and ߚଶ෢. In this instance, ߚ is 
consistently estimated using least squares as all variables on the right-hand side of the regression are 
exogenous and the error term satisfies the usual assumptions. Once the estimate ߛො of the threshold value ߛ is obtained, the data sample is partitioned into regimes or groups, based on whether the threshold 
variables are more or less than the corresponding estimates of their threshold values. The final slope 
parameters ߚଵ and ߚଶ associated with the regimes ܫሺݍ௜ ൑ ߛොሻ and ܫሺݍ௜ ൐ ߛොሻ are then estimated, giving ߚଵ෢ ൌ ߚଵ෢ሺߛොሻ for ܫሺݍ௜ ൑ ߛොሻ and ߚଶ෢ሺߛොሻ forܫሺݍ௜ ൐ ߛොሻ.  
 
4.3 Empirical Specification 
The purpose of our empirical analysis is to examine whether the relationship between leverage and firm 
performance is dependent on firm size. Our benchmark threshold model has a vector of debt ratiosܮܧܸ ൌሺܮ݁ݒ ?ǡ ܮ݁ݒ ?ǡ ܮ݁ݒ ?ሻᇱas the focus regressors, a vector of performance measuresܲܧܴ ൌ ሺܴܱܣǡ ܴܱܧǡ ܶ݋ܾ݅݊ᇱݏܳሻᇱ 
and control variables. There is one threshold variable, firm size, selected from the set of control variables, so we 
have a panel threshold regression model which will be estimated to determine the effect of leverage on firm 
performance for different firm sizes. The threshold regression model is ܲܧܴ௜௧ ൌ Ɋ௜ ൅ ߚଵ௦ܮܧ ௜ܸ௧ࡵሺܥ௜௧ ൑ ܿଵሻ ൅ ߚଶ௦ܮܧ ௜ܸ௧ࡵሺܥ௜௧ ൐ ܿଵሻ ൅ ߶௦ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧௦ ሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
where ݅ ൌ  ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ݊ ൌ ? ? ? represents individual firms, ݐ ൌ  ? ? ? ?ǡ ǥ Ǥ ܶ ൌ  ? ? ? ?ǡ represents time period, Ɋ௜ is the 
time invariant firm-specific fixed effect, ܲܧܴ௜௧ represents firm performance defined above, ߝ௜௧௦  is the error term 
associated with the threshold regression model generated by threshold variable ܽ, where ܽis firm size and ࡵሺǤ ሻ is 





5. Empirical Results of Threshold Analysis of the Effect of Leverage on Firm Performance in Nigeria 
We estimate the threshold regression model in equation 1.15 by fitting it to data as in Hansen (1999). The results 
are presented in the tables below. For each table, the first row displays the threshold variable, its estimated 
threshold value and the corresponding 95% confidence interval, where ܿ Ƹଵ  represents the estimated threshold value. 
The second section, A1, shows the impact of leverage on firm performance; that is, the regime-dependent 
                                                          
1See Hansen (1999) and Hansen (2000) for details on computing ߛො 
coefficients of each measure of leverage on each measure of firm performance. In particular, ܥ௜௧ ൑ Ƹܿଵand ܥ௜௧ ൐Ƹܿଵ represent low and high threshold regimes, respectively, for the threshold variable (firm size) while ߚመ௅ and ߚመ௎ 
denote the effects of leverage on growth in the low and high threshold regimes. The third section A2 show the 
effect of non-regime dependent regressors on performance while the fourth section A3 presents the diagnostics. 
 5.1 Leverage and ROA  
In this section, we present and discuss results of the impact of the three leverage measures on firm performance, 
ROA. The results, shown in Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, are the effects of total debt-to-asset ratio, long-term debt-to-
asset ratio and short-term debt-to-asset ratio on ROA, respectively. 





95% Confidence Intervals    
࡯࢏࢚       6.202 [6.200, 6.206] 
 
   









  ܁ܑܢ܍  -0.078** 
(2.41) 
    ܂܉ܠ            0.032 
          (1.46) 
  ۼܗܗ܎۽܊ܛ܍ܚܞ܉ܜܑܗܖܛ            505 ۯ܌ܒܝܛܜ܍܌܀૛            0.2265 ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜ            42.81 ۾ܚܗ܊ሺ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜሻ            0.0000 
Note: Results are obtained using Hansen (1999) estimation where regressors are taken as exogenous. The threshold variables are assumed to be 
exogenous, in line with Hansen (1999). Firm size is the threshold variables. Significance is denoted by * p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01.ROA is the return 
on assets (EBIT/ total assets), ROE is the return on equity (EBIT/ equity), Tob Q (7RELQ¶V Q) = (Market value of equity + book value of debt)/ book 
value of assets, TDTA is the total debt divided/ total assets; LTDTA is the long-term debt / total assets; STDTA is the short-term debt/total assets; Size 
represented as log of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). Leverage is TDTA, LTDTA or STDTA. 
 
Table 3.1 shows the results of estimating the benchmark threshold regression model in equation (1.15) using total 
debt-to-asset ratio and ROA as our measure of leverage and firm performance, respectively. The threshold variable 
is firm size. As shown in the table, the threshold estimate (in log) is 6.202. Thus, firms with size of more than 
6.202 are classified as high-SIZE group (i.e. large-sized firms) while firms with size below this level are classified 
A2. Impact of other covariates on firm performance - ROA 
A3. Threshold Regression Diagnostics 
as low-SIZE group (i.e. small-sized firms). The coefficient of leverage is negative and significant for the low-
SIZE group but not for the high-SIZE group. This finding sets the stage in support of our initial hypothesis as it 
indicates the presence of a threshold effect such that the impact of leverage on ROA is contingent on firm size 
and changes as we move from low to high firm size. Leverage has a negative effect on ROA when firm size is 
small, below the threshold level. For firms with size larger than the estimated threshold level, there is no evidence 
that leverage dampens firm performance. 
 
Table 3.2: Threshold value estimates and regime dependent slope coefficients ±dependent variable is ROA  
Threshold Variable 
 
          Estimated Thresholds 
 
95% Confidence Intervals    
࡯࢏࢚                    6.211 [6.197, 6.228] 
 
   
A1. Impact of long-term debt to asset ratio on firm performance - ROA     
 
          
 
          Lower regime (ܥ௜௧ ൑ Ƹܿଵሻ 
          ߚ෡௅                         Upper regime ሺܥ௜௧ ൐ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௎  ࡯࢏࢚                            -0.792*** 




  ܁ܑܢ܍  -0.059** 
(1.99) ܂܉ܠ            0.020 
          (0.99) 
  ۼܗܗ܎۽܊ܛ܍ܚܞ܉ܜܑܗܖܛ            505 ۯ܌ܒܝܛܜ܍܌܀૛            0.2825 ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜ            63.52 ۾ܚܗ܊ሺ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜሻ            0.0000 
Note: Results are obtained using Hansen (1999) estimation where regressors are taken as exogenous. . The threshold variables are assumed to be exogenous, in 
line with Hansen (1999). Firm size is the threshold variables. Significance is denoted by * p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. ROA is the return on assets (EBIT/ total 
assets), ROE is the return on equity (EBIT/ equity), Tob Q (Tobins Q) = (Market value of equity + book value of debt)/ book value of assets, TDTA is the total 
debt divided/ total assets; LTDTA is the long-term debt / total assets; STDTA is the short-term debt/total assets; Size represented as log of turnover, Tax = total 
tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). Leverage is TDTA, LTDTA or STDTA. 
 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 also report the results when the measures of leverage are long-run and short-run debt- to-asset 
ratios respectively. The results continue to show that leverage has a significantly negative impact on firm performance 
only when firm size is low. For large-sized firms, we cannot find any significant evidence that an increase in leverage 
weakens ROA. Thus, we find empirical evidence that firm size provides insights into the reason for an ambiguous 
relationship between leverage and firm performance. In all, the magnitude of the negative effects of leverage on ROA 
A2. Impact of other covariates on firm performance - ROA 
A3. Threshold Regression Diagnostics 
for small-sized firms is generally higher than the magnitude of the insignificant impact of leverage on ROA for large-
sized firms. This suggests that when leverage has a negative impact on ROA, the impact is more pronounced on small-
sized companies. 
Table 3.3: Threshold value estimates and regime dependent slope coefficients ±dependent variable is ROA  
Threshold Variable       Estimated Thresholds 
 





࡯࢏࢚                6.202 [6.120, 6.206] 
 
   




      Lower regime (ܥ௜௧ ൑ Ƹܿଵሻ 
             ߚ෡௅  Upper regime ሺܥ௜௧ ൐ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௎  ࡯࢏࢚   -0.236*** 
    (4.62) 
                          0.079 
                         (1.47) 
 
  ܁ܑܢ܍  0.022 
(0.60) ܂܉ܠ           0.029 
         (1.16) 
  ۼܗܗ܎۽܊ܛ܍ܚܞ܉ܜܑܗܖܛ           505 ۯ܌ܒܝܛܜ܍܌܀૛           0.1002 ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜ           7.28 ۾ܚܗ܊ሺ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜሻ           0.0000 
Note: Results are obtained using Hansen (1999) estimation where regressors are taken as exogenous.The threshold variables are assumed to be 
exogenous, in line with Hansen (1999). Firm size is the threshold variables. Significance is denoted by * p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. ROA is the return 
on assets (EBIT/ total assets), ROE is the return on equity (EBIT/ equity), Tob Q (Tobins Q) = (Market value of equity + book value of debt)/ book value 
of assets, TDTA is the total debt divided/ total assets; LTDTA is the long-term debt / total assets; STDTA is the short-term debt/total assets; Size 
represented as log of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). Leverage is TDTA, LTDTA or STDTA. 
 
 
            5.2    Leverage and ROE 
Turning now to the effect of the three measures of leverage on the second accounting measure of firm 
performance, ROE, we see that, like the magnitude of ROE from the summary statistics, the coefficient of the 
effect of each leverage measure on ROE is very high in magnitude. However, as in the case for ROA, we find 
that the three measures of leverage ± total debt to asset, long-term debt to asset and short-term debt to asset ratios 
± all have a negative effect on ROE for firms in the small-SIZE group. The results are shown in Tables 3.4, 
3.5and 3.6, and represent the effects of total debt-to-asset ratio, long-term debt-to-asset ratio and short-term 
debt-to-asset ratio on ROA, respectively. 
Table 3.4: Threshold value estimates and regime dependent slope coefficients ±dependent variable is ROE 
A2. Impact of other covariates on firm performance - ROA 
A3. Threshold Regression Diagnostics 
Threshold Variable 
 
     Estimated Thresholds 
 
95% Confidence Intervals    ࡯࢏࢚                 5.236 [5.154, 5.236] 
 
  
A1. Impact of total debt to asset ratio on firm performance ± ROE  
  
     Lower regime (ܥ௜௧ ൑ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௅  Upper regime ሺܥ௜௧ ൐ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௎  
-100.407*** 
   (6.72) 
                         0.334 
                         (0.05) 
 
  ܁ܑܢ܍  -42.833*** 
(4.56) ܂܉ܠ           0.799 
         (0.17) 
  
  ۼܗܗ܎۽܊ܛ܍ܚܞ܉ܜܑܗܖܛ           505 ۯ܌ܒܝܛܜ܍܌܀૛           0.0111 ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜ           11.39 ۾ܚܗ܊ሺ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜሻ           0.0000 
  
Note: Results are obtained using Hansen (1999) where regressors are taken as exogenous.The threshold variables are assumed to be exogenous, 
in line with Hansen (1999). Firm size is the threshold variables. Significance is denoted by * p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. ROA is the return on 
assets (EBIT/ total assets), ROE is the return on equity (EBIT/ equity), Tob Q (Tobins Q) = (Market value of equity + book value of debt)/ book 
value of assets, TDTA is the total debt divided/ total assets; LTDTA is the long-term debt / total assets; STDTA is the short-term debt/total assets; 
Size represented as log of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). Leverage is TDTA, LTDTA or STDTA. 
 





95% Confidence Intervals   ࡯࢏࢚         5.346  [5.214, 5.358] 
 
  
A1. Impact of long-run debt to asset ratio on firm performance ± ROE 
 
Lower regime (ܥ௜௧ ൑ Ƹܿଵሻ 
           ߚ෡௅  Upper regime ሺܥ௜௧ ൐ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௎  ࡯࢏࢚             -103.882*** 
                (3.16) 
                                  -3.791 
                                  (0.29) 
 
  ܁ܑܢ܍  -16.729* 
(-1.88) ܂܉ܠ             0.6233 
           (0.12) 
  
  ۼܗܗ܎۽܊ܛ܍ܚܞ܉ܜܑܗܖܛ             505 ۯ܌ܒܝܛܜ܍܌܀૛             0.0034 ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜ             2.51 ۾ܚܗ܊ሺ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜሻ             0.0417 
  
A2. Impact of other covariates on firm performance ± ROE 
A3. Threshold Regression Diagnostics 
A2. Impact of other covariates on firm performance ± ROE 
A3. Threshold Regression Diagnostics 
Note: Results are obtained using Hansen (1999) where regressors are taken as exogenous.The threshold variables are assumed to be exogenous, 
in line with Hansen (1999). Firm size is the threshold variables. Significance is denoted by * p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. ROA is the return on 
assets (EBIT/ total assets), ROE is the return on equity (EBIT/ equity), Tob Q (Tobins Q) = (Market value of equity + book value of debt)/ book 
value of assets, TDTA is the total debt divided/ total assets; LTDTA is the long-term debt / total assets; STDTA is the short-term debt/total assets; 
Size represented as log of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). Leverage is TDTA, LTDTA or STDTA. 
 
The negative effect of leverage on ROE for small-sized firms is highest when short-term debt to asset ratio is 
the measure of leverage and least when the leverage measure is total debt to asset ratio. Therefore, small-sized 
firms are better positioned to lessen ROE declines if the amount of short-term debt in their capital structure is 
optimally minimized. To the extent that our results are supported, this evidence is only true for small-sized 
firms and does not extend to large-sized firms. In fact, as with the case of ROA, we continue to find evidence 
that leverage has no significant effect on firm performance for large-sized firms, and the magnitude of the 
negative effect of leverage on firm performance for small-sized firms is several times higher than the 
magnitude of the insignificant effect of leverage on firm performance for large-sized firms. The threshold 
estimates for firm size, which splits the sample into high-SIZE and low-SIZE regimes, are 5.236, 5.346 and 
5.236 when the leverage measures are total debt to asset, long-term debt to asset and short-term debt to asset 
ratios respectively. 
Table 3.6: Threshold value estimates and regime dependent slope coefficients ±dependent variable is ROE  
Threshold Variable
 
        Estimated Thresholds 
 
95% Confidence Intervals   
࡯࢏࢚                  5.236 [5.179, 5.236] 
 
  




        Lower regime (ܥ௜௧ ൑ Ƹܿଵሻ 
                   ߚ෡௅  Upper regime ሺܥ௜௧ ൐ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௎  ࡯࢏࢚            -178.37*** 
             (8.04) 
                                   2.971 
                                   (0.40) 
 
  ܁ܑܢ܍  -42.22*** 
(4.98) ܂܉ܠ              0.665 
            (0.14) 
  
  ۼܗܗ܎۽܊ܛ܍ܚܞ܉ܜܑܗܖܛ              505 ۯ܌ܒܝܛܜ܍܌܀૛              0.0178 ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜ              16.36 ۾ܚܗ܊ሺ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜሻ              0.0000 
  
Note: Results are obtained using Hansen (1999) where regressors are taken as exogenous. The threshold variables are assumed to be exogenous, 
in line with Hansen (1999). Firm size is the threshold variables. Significance is denoted by * p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. ROA is the return on 
assets (EBIT/ total assets), ROE is the return on equity (EBIT/ equity), Tob Q (Tobins Q) = (Market value of equity + book value of debt)/ book 
value of assets, TDTA is the total debt divided/ total assets; LTDTA is the long-term debt / total assets; STDTA is the short-term debt/total assets; 
Size represented as log of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). Leverage is TDTA, LTDTA or STDTA. 
            /HYHUDJHDQG7RELQ¶V4 
A2. Impact of other covariates on firm performance ± ROE 
A3. Threshold Regression Diagnostics 
Finally, Tables 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 report the results of the impact of the three leverage measures - total debt-to-
asset ratio, long-term debt-to-asset ratio and short-term debt-to-asset ratio - RQ7RELQ¶s Q, a measure of firm 
market performance. Contrary to results for ROA and ROE, and in line with Olokoyo (2013) and several other 
studies, we find that the three measures of leverage are positively linked with ToELQ¶V4 and the relationship is 
significant, suggesting that higher levels of leverage in the capital structure of listed firms in Nigeria are 
associated with a stronger firm market performance. Our results however indicate that the positive effect is 
mostly much stronger in the low-SIZE regime for all measures of leverage.  
To be clear, the estimated threshold levels for firm size are 6.578, 7.533 and 3.978 when the measures of leverage 
are total debt to asset, long-term debt to asset and short-term debt to asset ratios respectively. The coefficient of 
leverage is positive and strongly significant in both regimes for all of the three measures of leverage. However, 
the strength of the positive relationship depends on the size of the firm and is mostly higher for small-sized 
firms. The positive effect of leverage on firm market performance for small-sized firms is highest when short-
term debt to asset ratio is the measure of leverage and least when the leverage measure is total debt to asset ratio. 
For firms in the high-size group, i.e. the large-sized firms, the positive effect is strongest when long-term debt 
to asset ratio is the measure of leverage and weakest when the measure of leverage is total debt to asset ratio. 
Accordingly, large-sized firms can boost their market performance if they favour a higher portion of long-term 
debt in their capital structure whereas small-sized firms can boost market performance by embracing a higher 
proportion of short-term debt in their capital structure. 
          Table 3.7: Threshold value estimates and regime dependent slope coefficients ±GHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHLV7RELQ¶V4 
Threshold Variable
 
        Estimated Thresholds 
 
95% Confidence Intervals   ࡯࢏࢚                     6.578 [6.571, 6.581] 
 
  




         Lower regime (ܥ௜௧ ൑ Ƹܿଵሻ 
                 ߚ෡௅  Upper regime ሺܥ௜௧ ൐ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௎  ࡯࢏࢚           1.0146*** 
            (95.48) 
                               0.980*** 
                               (75.57) 
 
  ܁ܑܢ܍  -0.005 
(0.45) ܂܉ܠ            -0.0002 
          (0.03) 
  
  ۼܗܗ܎۽܊ܛ܍ܚܞ܉ܜܑܗܖܛ            505 ۯ܌ܒܝܛܜ܍܌܀૛           0.9368 ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜ           3483.64 ۾ܚܗ܊ሺ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜሻ           0.0000 
Note: Results are obtained using Hansen (1999) where regressors are taken as exogenous.The threshold variables are assumed to be exogenous, 
in line with Hansen (1999). Firm size is the threshold variables. Significance is denoted by * p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. ROA is the return on 
assets (EBIT/ total assets), ROE is the return on equity (EBIT/ equity), Tob Q (Tobins Q) = (Market value of equity + book value of debt)/ book 
value of assets, TDTA is the total debt divided/ total assets; LTDTA is the long-term debt / total assets; STDTA is the short-term debt/total assets; 
Size represented as log of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). Leverage is TDTA, LTDTA or STDTA. 
 
A2. Impact of other covariates on firm performance ± 7RELQ¶V4 
A3. Threshold Regression Diagnostics 
In all, our result suggests that irrespective of the measure of leverage, when the effect of leverage is positive or 
negative on firm performance, the effects are mostly magnified in the small-SIZE group, meaning the extent of 
positive or negative effect of leverage on firm performance is mostly higher and more pronounced for small-sized 
companies in comparison to large-sized companies. Meanwhile, as a by-product, our results consistently find that 
tax does not impact firm performance, and the positive relationship between firm size and performance is not robust 
or consistently supported in our analysis. 
    Table 3.8: Threshold value estimates and regime dependent slope coefficients ±GHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHLV7RELQ¶V4 
Threshold Variable
 
       Estimated Thresholds 
  
95% Confidence Intervals   ࡯࢏࢚ 7.533 [7.523, 7.537] 
 
  




Lower regime (ܥ௜௧ ൑ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௅  Upper regime ሺܥ௜௧ ൐ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௎  ࡯࢏࢚       1.152*** 
       (14.82) 
                                    4.489*** 
                                     (9.78) 
 
  ܁ܑܢ܍  -0.134*** 
(2.91) ܂܉ܠ            0.016 





  ۼܗܗ܎۽܊ܛ܍ܚܞ܉ܜܑܗܖܛ       505 ۯ܌ܒܝܛܜ܍܌܀૛       0.4287 ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜ       88.09 ۾ܚܗ܊ሺ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜሻ       0.0000 
  
Note: Results are obtained using Hansen (1999) where regressors are taken as exogenous. The threshold variables are assumed to be exogenous, in 
line with Hansen (1999). Firm size is the threshold variables. Significance is denoted by * p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. ROA is the return on assets 
(EBIT/ total assets), ROE is the return on equity (EBIT/ equity), Tob Q (Tobins Q) = (Market value of equity + book value of debt)/ book value of 
assets, TDTA is the total debt divided/ total assets; LTDTA is the long-term debt / total assets; STDTA is the short-term debt/total assets; Size 
represented as log of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). Leverage is TDTA, LTDTA or STDTA. 
 
Putting everything together, our results suggest that leverage boosts the market performance of all sizes of 
firms, though the positive impact varies, to a considerable extent, with firm size. However, leverage dampens 
the accounting performance of firms in the small-SIZE regime. The results also suggest that there is a trade-off 
on the type of leverage to adopt for firms in the small-SIZE regime. This is because while such firms are better 
positioned to boost ROE if the amount of short-term debt in their capital structure is optimally minimized, they 
stand to benefit more from an improved market performance 7RELQ¶V4 if they increase the size of short-term 
debt in their capital mix. Thus, it appears that small-sized firms cannot simultaneously achieve both goals of 
improving accounting performance and market performance via leverage. If they minimize short-term debt in 
order to limit the fall in accounting performance, they would lose out on maximizing the gain in market 
performance. We find no evidence that this trade-off extends to firms in the high-SIZE regime. We perform 
A2. Impact of other covariates on firm performance ± 7RELQ¶V4 
A3. Threshold Regression Diagnostics 
further robustness checks by including to our set of regressors the ages of the firms in our sample. The results, 
reported in the appendices, continue to reiterate most of the above findings. 
 
Table 3.9: Threshold value estimates and regime dependent slope coefficients ±GHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHLV7RELQ¶V4 
Threshold Variable
 
     Estimated Thresholds 
 
95% Confidence Intervals   ࡯࢏࢚                3.978 [3.963, 4.024] 
 
  




     Lower regime (ܥ௜௧ ൑ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௅  Upper regime ሺܥ௜௧ ൐ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௎  ۱ܑܜ        1.679*** 
        (12.86) 
                               1.085*** 
                               (34.24) 
 
  ܁ܑܢ܍  0.001 
(0.03) ܂܉ܠ            -0.010 
          (0.49) 
  
  ۼܗܗ܎۽܊ܛ܍ܚܞ܉ܜܑܗܖܛ            505 ۯ܌ܒܝܛܜ܍܌܀૛            0.7234 ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜ            335.53 ۾ܚܗ܊ሺ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜሻ            0.0000 
Note: Results are obtained using Hansen (1999) where regressors are taken as exogenous.The threshold variables are assumed to be exogenous, 
in line with Hansen (1999). Firm size is the threshold variables. Significance is denoted by * p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. ROA is the return on 
assets (EBIT/ total assets), ROE is the return on equity (EBIT/ equity), Tob Q (Tobins Q) = (Market value of equity + book value of debt)/ book 
value of assets, TDTA is the total debt divided/ total assets; LTDTA is the long-term debt / total assets; STDTA is the short-term debt/total assets; 
Size represented as log of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). Leverage is TDTA, LTDTA or STDTA. 
 
An important question that naturally follows considering WKHILQGLQJVLQWKLVSDSHULVµZK\LVWKHLPSDFWRI
leverage on firm performance different for different firm sizes and why does leverage weaken the accounting 
performance of small-sized firms but not so for large-VL]HGILUPV"¶:HEHOLHYHWKDWFRPSDUHGWRVPDOO-sized 
firms, large-VL]HGILUPVLQ1LJHULD¶VUHDOVHFWRUVDUHEHWWHUDEOHWR position themselves and utilize economies 
of scale to their advantage. Thus, compared to their small-sized counterparts, they are better able to generate 
earnings or returns on assets that offset their average cost of leverage. The large-sized firms are also able to 
attract significantly more favourable debt deals, with favourable borrowing terms than their smaller 
counterparts, due to their perceived superiority over their smaller counterparts. All these explain why financial 
leverage relates negatively with the accounting performance of small firms but has no evidence of a negative 
influence on the performance of large firms. A major policy or corporate governance implication of our 
findings is the suggestion that 1LJHULD¶VOLVWHG real-sector firms can improve performance by either decreasing 
leverage and/or increasing non- debt financing in their capital mix. If they increase leverage, this should be 
done on the back of an increase in their sizes to help lessen the negative influence of leverage on performance. 
6. Summary of Results and Implications for Firm Corporate Governance and Policymakers 
A2. Impact of other covariates on firm performance ± 7RELQ¶V4 
A3. Threshold Regression Diagnostics 
Our results show that the negative effect of leverage on firm performance is most eminent and significant for 
small-sized firms; however, the effect diminishes as a firm grows, eventually vanishing when firm size exceeds 
its estimated threshold level. This implies firm size does influence the link between leverage and firm 
SHUIRUPDQFH VR WKDW WKHUH H[LVWV D OHYHO RU µFXW-RIISRLQW¶RI ILUP VL]H VXFK WKDW WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ
leverage and firm performance changes. We find that this outcome continues to hold, irrespective of the debt 
UDWLRVXWLOL]HG2XUUHVXOWVDOVRVKRZWKDWWKHHIIHFWRIOHYHUDJHRQ7RELQ¶V4LVSRVLWLYHIRU1LJHULD¶VOLVWHG
firms and that the strength of the positive relationship depends on firm size; it is mostly higher for small-sized 
firms. 
Given this, a plausible empirical explanation for the differences in the effect of leverage on firm performance 
documented in the literature could be the failure of existing empirical studies to model the contingent role that 
firm size plays in the leverage-performance nexus. Our results confirm that firm size provides some 
explanation for the ambiguous relationship between leverage and firm performance. That is, there exists an 
optimal level of firm size at which leverage does not diminish firm performance.  
This finding suggests that size is a crucial factor as large-sized firms in Nigeria are better able to reap the 
benefits of leverage than their smaller counterparts. Thus, when deciding whether increasing leverage is a 
viable option for firms, management and policymakers should particularly consider the influence of firm size 
in their decision-making SURFHVVDV LWFRXOGEH WKHµJDPHFKDQJHU¶DQGGHFLGLQJ IDFWRURQ WKH LPSDFW WKDW
leverage will ultimately have on firm performance. The evidence of threshold effects implies the existence of 
nonlinearities between leverage and firm performance, where the nonlinear agent is the firm size. The much-
emphasized demerits of leverage, such as exposure to greater financial distress which dampens firm 
performance, seem to be more of a concern for small firms and less concern for large firms. 
One important consequence of our finding is its potential to inspire a tradition where firms take size into 
consideration before reaching a decision on the amount of debt to include on their balance sheets in a bid to 
mitigate the negative influence of leverage on performance. This is a fresh perspective that researchers, 
policymakers and business managers can benefit from and to the best of our knowledge, no previous study has 
addressed the problem of determining the impact of leverage on firm performance under the threshold 
IUDPHZRUNZLWK ILUPVL]HDVD WKUHVKROGYDULDEOH IRU1LJHULD¶V OLVWHGILUPV0RVWSUHYLRXVVWXGLHVRQ WKH
relationship between leverage and firm performance assume that leverage and firm performance bear a linear 
or monotonic relationship, an assumption which this paper has shown to be very fragile 
 
7. Conclusion 
We present new evidence on the contingent role of firm size in determining the relationship between 
leverage and firm performance, using data from 101 listed firms in Nigeria over the period 2003 ± 2007. 
We use three measures of leverage ± total debt to asset ratio, long-term debt to asset ratio and short-term 
debt to asset ratio ± and three measures of firm performance ± ROA and ROE which are firm accounting 
performance measures DQG7RELQ¶V4ZKLFKUHSUHVHQWV ILUPPDUNHWSHUIRUPDQFHPHDVXUH2QHPDMRU
contribution of the paper is the use of a new threshold, firm size, and the adoption of the threshold 
regression model of Hansen (1999) to comprehensively uncover the role of firm size in the relationship 
between leverage and firm performance. In order words, we ask the question ± does size matter in the 
relationship between leverage and firm performance? 
We find that the answer to the above question is yes. Particularly, our results suggest that much of the 
negative effects of leverage on firm performance are borne by small-sized firms while no evidence exists 
that the same is true for large-sized firms; this finding holds for the three measures of leverage employed. 
In the case of 7RELQ¶V4ZKHUHWKHLPSDFWRIOHYHUDJHRQILUPSHUIRUPDQFHLVSRVLWLYH in both low- and 
high-SIZE regimes, we find that the positive effect is mostly much stronger in the low-SIZE regime for 
all measures of leverage. Furthermore, we find that the negative effect of leverage on ROE and ROA for 
small-sized firms is highest when short-term debt to asset ratio is the measure of leverage while the 
SRVLWLYH HIIHFW RI OHYHUDJH RQ ILUP PDUNHW SHUIRUPDQFH PHDVXUH 7RELQ¶V 4 IRU VPDOO-sized firms is 
highest when short-term debt to asset ratio is the measure of leverage, leading to a trade-off between 
maximizing gains in market performance and minimizing loss in accounting performance via leverage for 
small-sized firms in Nigeria. 
Overall, WKHKLJKHVWSRVLWLYHLPSDFWRIOHYHUDJHRQ7RELQ¶V4 occurs when the leverage measure is long-
term debt to asset ratio and firms belong to the high-SIZE regime. Thus, we find evidence that less reliance 
on short-term debt and more reliance on long-term debt appear to be an optimal strategy for large-sized 
companies but not necessarily for small-sized companies as the highlighted trade-off has revealed. Our 
evidence of a threshold effect of firm size in the leverage-firm performance nexus is a revealing highlight 
of this paper because the contingent role of firm size in the leverage-firm performance relationship has 
never been investigated in the literature. 
A weakness of this research, mostly due to data issues, is that we have been unable to control for many 
other plausible determinants of firm performance because of the difficulty in getting data on listed firms 
in Nigeria. Our near-term research agenda will be to expand the control variables and extend the current 
analysis to the few SSA countries with functional stock exchanges. We also aim to include a wider array 
of plausible thresholds and controls in the threshold model, leading to a system of estimable simultaneous 
threshold models. Finally, future research will involve an extension of our data to include firms listed on 
the major stock exchanges of emerging and developed markets. 
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1. Charts of Average Values of Variables, by Industry 
  
 
Note: ROA is the return on assets (EBIT/ total assets), ROE is the return on equity (EBIT/ equity), Tob Q (Tobins Q) =( Market value of equity + book 
value of debt)/ book value of assets TDTA is the total debt divided/ total assets; LTDTA is the long-term debt / total assets; STDTA is the short-term 




2. Average Values of Variables, by Industry 
 
ROA ROE TobLQ¶V4 TDTA LTDTA STDTA SIZE TAX 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































AIRLINE  0.174539 2.329095 0.63924 0.531119 0.383448 0.14767 6.301574 0.157308 
AUTO  0.051253 0.77824 0.645522 0.489164 0.151518 0.337652 6.257843 0.260625 
BREWERIES -0.13219 5.529585 1.40321 1.18173 0.368927 0.812803 6.774649 0.155296 
BUILDING 0.12226 1.270133 0.66265 0.546277 0.147062 0.399217 6.229009 0.086025 
CHEMICALS 0.123473 1.307208 0.937644 0.714037 0.365516 0.348521 5.97982 0.359768 
COMPUTER -0.24699 -0.26481 1.48072 1.267828 0.743772 0.524056 5.626481 0.103066 
CONGLOMERATE 0.266649 1.085452 0.652039 0.323076 0.114408 0.208668 6.693661 0.284089 
CONSTRUCTN 0.017802 3.429023 1.464224 1.414017 0.26972 1.144289 6.618492 0.454161 
EMERGMKT 0.004804 0.034567 0.960814 0.466999 0.099956 0.367044 4.84845 0.140622 
ENGTECH -0.04028 0.188296 1.647893 0.597884 0.161951 0.435933 5.299827 0.131951 
FOODBEV 0.111354 7.161461 0.916088 0.780976 0.336074 0.444893 6.716195 0.153792 
HEALTHCARE 0.144383 1.735351 0.461552 0.337817 0.126062 0.211755 6.174185 0.334677 
HOTEL 0.063434 0.452596 0.8412 0.642628 0.227662 0.414966 6.350634 0.154674 
INDUSTPROD 0.14643 1.003962 0.881245 0.630398 0.305627 0.32477 6.324612 0.246319 
INFOTECH -0.02069 87.2838 1.186247 1.132811 0.48793 0.64488 6.286231 0.060278 
MACHINERY -0.05477 -1.07663 0.896602 0.849806 0.305221 0.544584 2.355918 -0.02 
MARITIME 0.163739 19.02517 0.53202 0.285562 0.154602 0.130961 5.914158 0.164908 
MEDIA -0.02265 0.004973 0.305781 0.14585 0.004018 0.141832 6.070665 -0.60595 
PACKAGING 0.040595 0.711619 0.725736 0.622755 0.238425 0.384404 6.322713 0.701972 
PETROLEUM 0.125759 10.25365 0.890582 0.773446 0.225662 0.547784 6.756288 0.182107 
PRINTING 0.247874 1.612649 0.516285 0.325752 0.091931 0.233821 5.954017 0.332438 
REALEST 0.036687 2.067574 0.440202 0.421687 0.012541 0.409146 6.653794 0.231819 
ROADTRANS 0.101781 2.023542 0.537719 0.438884 0.171725 0.267159 6.506034 0.253863 
SERVICES 0.10057 1.362767 2.000318 1.545987 0.761827 0.78416 4.529318 0.124776 
TEXTILES -0.03958 -1.01166 0.301165 0.26696 0.051106 0.215854 7.30364 -0.28707 
Note: ROA is the return on assets (EBIT/ total assets),ROE is the return on equity (EBIT/ equity), Tob Q (Tobins Q) =( Market value of equity + book value of debt)/book 
value of assets; TDTA is the total debt divided/ total assets; LTDTA is the long-term debt / total assets; STDTA is the short-term debt/total assets; Size represented as log 
of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). Leverage is TDTA, LTDTA or STDTA 
 
3. Largest and smallest average values of variables, by Industry 
 
ROA ROE 7RELQ¶V4 TDTA LTDTA STDTA SIZE 
LARGEST CONGLOMERATE INFOTECH SERVICES SERVICES SERVICES CONSTRUCTN TEXTILES
LEAST COMPUTER MACHINERY TEXTILES MEDIA MEDIA MARITIME MACHINER
Note: ROA is the return on assets (EBIT/ total assets), ROE is the return on equity (EBIT/ equity), Tob Q (Tobins Q) =( Market value of equity + book value of debt)/ book 
value of assets; TDTA is the total debt divided/ total assets; LTDTA is the long-term debt / total assets; STDTA is the short-term debt/total assets; Size represented as log 
of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). Leverage is TDTA, LTDTA or STDTA 
 
4. Estimated threshold value of firm size and significance level for different measures of leverage 
  
ROA 
   
ROE 
   
Tobin's Q 
 
            
 
Thresh Val. F-stat P-value 
 
Thresh Val.  F-stat P-value 
 
Thresh Val. F-stat P-value 
TDTA 6.2016*** 111.69 0.000 TDTA 5.2355** 51.74 0.013 TDTA 5.1476 6.62 0.485 
LDTA 6.211 - - LDTA 5.1072* 9.73 0.090 LDTA 7.5332*** 64.52 0.000 
SDTA 6.2050* 23.66 0.088 SDTA 5.2360** 75.88 0.020 SDTA 4.1235* 26.01 0.070 
Note: ROA is the return on assets, ROE is the return on equity; LTDTA is the long-term debt / total assets; STDTA is the short-term debt/total assets; Size represented as 
log of turnover. Leverage is TDTA, LTDTA or STDTA. Stata threshold regression code fails to return f-stat and p-val. for estimated threshold when leverage is LTDA. 
5. Results obtained after controlling for firm age 
A. Dependent variable is ROA 
Table 5.1: Threshold value estimates and regime dependent slope coefficients ±dependent variable is ROA  
Threshold Variable
 
          Estimated Thresholds 
 
95% Confidence Intervals    ࡯࢏࢚                   6.211 [6.203, 6.215] 
 
  




Lower regime (ܥ௜௧ ൑ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௅  Upper regime ሺܥ௜௧ ൐ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௎  ࡯࢏࢚        -0.419*** 




  ܁ܑܢ܍                            -0.113*** 
                             (2.41) ܂܉ܠ                                      0.086** 




   ۼܗܗ܎۽܊ܛ܍ܚܞ܉ܜܑܗܖܛ                                         480 ۯ܌ܒܝܛܜ܍܌܀૛  0.1661 ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜ                                          33.98 ۾ܚܗ܊ሺ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜሻ  0.0000 
 





95% Confidence Intervals    ࡯࢏࢚            6.211 [6.197, 6.222] 
 
  




Lower regime (ܥ௜௧ ൑ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௅  Upper regime ሺܥ௜௧ ൐ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௎  ࡯࢏࢚         -0.803*** 




  ܁ܑܢ܍                              -0.076** 
                            (2.10) ܂܉ܠ                                         0.032 
                                       (0.82) ۯ܏܍                                         0.013 
                                       (1.13) 
 
  
   ۼܗܗ܎۽܊ܛ܍ܚܞ܉ܜܑܗܖܛ                                            480 ۯ܌ܒܝܛܜ܍܌܀૛  0.2190 ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜ  33.98 ۾ܚܗ܊ሺ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜሻ  0.0000 
 





95% Confidence Intervals 
 
  ࡯࢏࢚        6.205 [6.124, 6.206] 
 
   
A2. Impact of other covariates on firm performance - ROA 
A3. Threshold Regression Diagnostics 
A2. Impact of other covariates on firm performance - ROA 
A3. Threshold Regression Diagnostics 
A1. Impact of short-run debt to asset ratio on firm performance - ROA  









  ܁ܑܢ܍                            0.020 
                          (0.45) ܂܉ܠ                                     0.075 
                                   (1.55) 
       Age                                     0.004 
                                   (0.28) 
   
 
  ۼܗܗ܎۽܊ܛ܍ܚܞ܉ܜܑܗܖܛ                                      480 ۯ܌ܒܝܛܜ܍܌܀૛  0.0916 ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜ                                      7.28 ۾ܚܗ܊ሺ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜሻ  0.0000 
  
 
B. Dependent variable is ROE 





95% Confidence Intervals  ࡯࢏࢚         5.236 [5.165, 5.254]      
 
  
A1. Impact of total debt to asset ratio on firm performance ± ROE 
  
Lower regime (ܥ௜௧ ൑ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௅  Upper regime ሺܥ௜௧ ൐ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௎  ࡯࢏࢚ -121.45





  ܁ܑܢ܍                                   -64.34*** 
                                   (5.33) ܂܉ܠ                                          1.874 
(0.20) 







 ۼܗܗ܎۽܊ܛ܍ܚܞ܉ܜܑܗܖܛ                                             480 ۯ܌ܒܝܛܜ܍܌܀૛   0.0091 ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜ  10.66 ۾ܚܗ܊ሺ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜሻ   0.0000 
 
        Table 5.5: Threshold value estimates and regime dependent slope coefficients ±dependent variable is ROE  
Threshold Variable
 
                Estimated Thresholds 
 
95% Confidence Intervals   ࡯࢏࢚                        5.346 [5.224, 5.3577] 
 
  
A2. Impact of other covariates on firm performance - ROA 
A3. Threshold Regression Diagnostics 
         A2. Impact of other covariates on firm performance ± ROE 
A3. Threshold Regression Diagnostics 




Lower regime (ܥ௜௧ ൑ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௅  Upper regime ሺܥ௜௧ ൐ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௎  
          -117.47*** 
          (3.27) 
                                      -3.98 
                                     (0.30) 
 
 
  ܁ܑܢ܍                               -22.31** 
                             (2.01) ܂܉ܠ                                          1.617 
                                        (0.17) 
        Age                                           0.789 






 ۼܗܗ܎۽܊ܛ܍ܚܞ܉ܜܑܗܖܛ                                             480 ۯ܌ܒܝܛܜ܍܌܀૛   0.0033 ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜ                                             2.15 ۾ܚܗ܊ሺ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜሻ   0.0592 
 
 Table 5.6: Threshold value estimates and regime dependent slope coefficients ±dependent variable is ROE  
Threshold Variable 
 
   Estimated Thresholds 
 
95% Confidence Intervals   ࡯࢏࢚            5.236 [5.179, 5.236] 
 
  




Lower regime (ܥ௜௧ ൑ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௅  Upper regime ሺܥ௜௧ ൐ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௎  ࡯࢏࢚         -178.37*** 




  ܁ܑܢ܍  -64.852*** 
(5.90) ܂܉ܠ             1.146 
           (0.13) 
                        Age             2.659 








           Table 5.7: Threshold value estimates and regime dependent slope coefficients ±GHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHLV7RELQ¶V4 
Threshold Variable
 
             Estimated Thresholds 
 
95% Confidence Intervals   
A2. Impact of other covariates on firm performance ± ROE 
A3. Threshold Regression Diagnostics 
A2. Impact of other covariates on firm performance ± ROE 
A3. Threshold Regression Diagnostics 
࡯࢏࢚                       6.573 [6.571, 6.578] 
 
  




Lower regime (ܥ௜௧ ൑ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௅  Upper regime ሺܥ௜௧ ൐ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௎  ࡯࢏࢚         1.0122*** 




  ܁ܑܢ܍  0.003 
(0.22) ܂܉ܠ             -0.002 
           (0.15) ۯ܏܍             0.003 
           (0.86) 
  
  ۼܗܗ܎۽܊ܛ܍ܚܞ܉ܜܑܗܖܛ             480 ۯ܌ܒܝܛܜ܍܌܀૛             0.9319 ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜ             2826.06 ۾ܚܗ܊ሺ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜሻ             0.0000 
 





95% Confidence Intervals   ࡯࢏࢚        7.531 [7.514, 7.533] 
 




Lower regime (ܥ௜௧ ൑ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௅  Upper regime ሺܥ௜௧ ൐ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௎  ࡯࢏࢚    1.113*** 
   (14.11) 
4.447*** 
                                         (9.56) 
 
  ܁ܑܢ܍                              -0.1911*** 
                              (3.42) ܂܉ܠ                                          0.076 
                                          (1.26) ۯ܏܍                                           0.0294 
(1.62) 
   
 
  ۼܗܗ܎۽܊ܛ܍ܚܞ܉ܜܑܗܖܛ                                            480 ۯ܌ܒܝܛܜ܍܌܀૛  0.2959 ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜ  67.84 ۾ܚܗ܊ሺ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜሻ   0.0000 
  
 





95% Confidence Intervals 
  ࡯࢏࢚        4.1235 [4.1030, 4.1283]   
A2. Impact of other covariates on firm performance ± 7RELQ¶V4 
A3. Threshold Regression Diagnostics 
A2. Impact of other covariates on firm performance ± 7RELQ¶V4 
A3. Threshold Regression Diagnostics 




Lower regime (ܥ௜௧ ൑ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௅  Upper regime ሺܥ௜௧ ൐ Ƹܿଵሻ ߚ෡௎  ۱ܑܜ 1.848*** 
(11.24) 
                                  1.089*** 
                                   (34.08) 
 
  ܁ܑܢ܍                               0.078 
                             (1.23) ܂܉ܠ                                          -0.039 
                                        (0.99) ۯ܏܍                                          0.0069 
                                        (0.56) 
   
   ۼܗܗ܎۽܊ܛ܍ܚܞ܉ܜܑܗܖܛ                                            480 ۯ܌ܒܝܛܜ܍܌܀૛  0.6817 ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜ  266.46 ۾ܚܗ܊ሺ۴ െ ܁ܜ܉ܜሻ  0.0000 
Note: ROA is the return on assets (EBIT/ total assets), ROE is the return on equity (EBIT/ equity), Tob Q (Tobins Q) =( Market value of equity 
+ book value of debt)/ book value of assets; TDTA is the total debt divided/ total assets; LTDTA is the long-term debt / total assets; STDTA 
is the short-term debt/total assets; Size represented as log of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). Leverage is 
TDTA, LTDTA or STDTA.  We found information on firm age for 96 out of 101 countries for the 5-year period. Consequently, the overall 
sample size or number of observations NT decreased to 480 from 505 for each regression in tables 5.1 ± 5.9 
 
6. Mean and standard deviation of variables by firm 
 
Mean of variables Firm 
 
ROA ROE Tob  TDTA LTDTA STDTA SIZE TAX 
 
AFPRINT -0.030 -0.334 0.594 0.485 0.236 0.250 6.801 -0.544 
 
ELLAH LAKES PLC 0.003 9.496 0.509 0.415 0.238 0.177 4.236 0.141 
 
LIVESTOCK 0.169 4.269 2.633 2.468 0.167 2.301 5.773 0.569 
 
OKITIPUPA 0.089 0.392 3.292 3.021 1.049 1.972 4.250 0.178 
 
OKOMU 0.108 3.038 0.349 0.313 0.239 0.074 6.394 0.036 
 
PRESCO 0.142 1.978 0.650 0.578 0.393 0.185 6.350 0.209 
 
AIRLINE SER 0.162 2.388 0.685 0.553 0.438 0.115 6.148 0.030 
 
NAHCO 0.187 2.270 0.594 0.510 0.329 0.180 6.455 0.285 
 
DUNLOP -0.064 -1.012 0.636 0.567 0.286 0.282 6.723 -0.112 
 
INCAR -0.048 -0.098 1.152 0.833 0.118 0.716 5.133 0.619 
 
R.T. BRISCO 0.266 3.445 0.149 0.067 0.051 0.016 6.918 0.274 
 
GUINNESS 0.290 19.598 0.364 0.349 0.200 0.149 7.690 0.302 
 
INT BREWERIES -0.306 -0.611 2.743 2.244 0.403 1.841 5.656 -0.100 
 
JOS INT BREW -0.795 -1.541 2.075 1.766 0.777 0.989 5.842 0.061 
 
NIGERIAN BREW 0.283 4.673 0.431 0.368 0.095 0.273 7.911 0.358 
 
ASHAKA CEM 0.614 7.485 0.196 0.111 0.057 0.054 7.118 0.334 
 
BENUE CEMENT -0.116 -0.814 1.297 1.257 0.070 1.187 4.744 0.118 
 
CEM. CO. NORTH 0.045 0.501 0.907 0.811 0.065 0.747 6.749 -0.376 
 
LAFARGE WAPCO 0.115 2.432 0.748 0.703 0.456 0.247 7.410 0.027 
 
NIGERIAN ROPES 0.084 0.230 0.544 0.175 0.131 0.044 5.600 0.295 
 
NIGERIAN WIRE -0.042 -2.678 0.390 0.325 0.116 0.209 5.354 0.076 
 
BERGER PAINTS 0.153 1.083 0.331 0.206 0.074 0.132 6.309 0.226 
 
CHEM and ALLIED 0.398 3.417 0.231 0.109 0.104 0.005 6.210 0.338 
 
DN MEYER PLC -0.003 0.381 0.630 0.342 0.162 0.180 6.236 0.273 
 
IPWA -0.069 -0.176 2.784 2.260 1.732 0.529 5.479 -0.003 
 
NIG-GERMAN CHEM 0.126 2.370 0.249 0.195 0.090 0.105 6.347 0.391 
 
A2. Impact of other covariates on firm performance ± 7RELQ¶V4 
A3. Threshold Regression Diagnostics 
PREMIER PAINTS 0.136 0.768 1.400 1.171 0.031 1.141 5.297 0.933 
 
NAT. SPORTS LOTTERY -0.335 -0.631 4.645 4.046 2.046 2.000 1.943 -0.100 
 
RED STAR 0.424 4.322 0.242 0.095 0.039 0.055 6.361 0.354 
 
TRANS-NAT. EXPRESS 0.213 0.397 1.113 0.497 0.200 0.297 5.284 0.120 
 
NCR NIGERIA PLC -0.921 -1.987 2.895 2.341 2.123 0.218 6.073 0.188 
 
OMATEK 0.030 1.608 0.653 0.632 0.228 0.404 5.851 0.100 
 
THOMAS WYATT -0.147 -1.064 1.489 1.339 0.184 1.155 4.882 -0.084 
 
TRIPPLE GEE 0.049 0.384 0.886 0.760 0.439 0.320 5.700 0.209 
 
A.G. LEVENTIS 0.107 0.606 0.291 0.102 0.044 0.058 6.819 0.324 
 
CHELLARAMS 0.075 1.137 0.157 0.091 0.053 0.038 6.874 0.337 
 
JOHN HOLT -0.011 -0.158 0.358 0.299 0.059 0.240 4.111 0.215 
 
P.Z. CUSSONS 0.164 3.915 0.157 0.115 0.046 0.068 7.632 0.328 
 
SCOA 1.046 1.386 1.142 0.613 0.118 0.494 6.576 0.128 
 
UAC 0.158 0.202 1.038 0.257 0.174 0.083 7.421 0.337 
 
UNILEVER 0.327 0.509 1.422 0.785 0.307 0.478 7.423 0.319 
 
CAPPA and D'ALBERTO 0.303 5.794 3.053 2.997 0.181 2.816 6.618 0.347 
 
COSTAIN WEST AFR. -0.415 -4.361 1.229 1.172 0.569 0.603 6.311 0.003 
 
JULIUS BERGER 0.090 11.157 0.767 0.757 0.088 0.669 7.641 0.462 
 
ROADS NIGERIA PLC 0.093 1.126 0.808 0.731 0.241 0.490 5.904 1.005 
 
ADSWITCH PLC 0.059 0.050 1.251 0.576 0.047 0.529 4.565 0.265 
 
CAPITAL OIL -0.005 0.013 0.965 0.644 0.066 0.577 5.111 0.190 
 
JULI PLC -0.076 -0.110 0.934 0.171 0.050 0.121 5.222 -0.215 
 
SMART PRODUCTS 0.042 0.186 0.693 0.478 0.237 0.241 4.496 0.322 
 
CUTIX PLC 0.441 0.861 0.691 0.155 0.068 0.087 5.879 0.307 
 
INTERLINKED TECH -0.522 -0.484 2.605 1.041 0.256 0.785 4.721 -0.043 
 
7-UP BOTTLING CO. 0.257 8.283 0.412 0.382 0.233 0.149 7.269 0.340 
 
BIG TREAT PLC 0.036 0.228 1.346 1.198 0.726 0.472 5.636 0.437 
 
CADBURY NIG. PLC 0.097 1.784 0.734 0.703 0.151 0.552 7.342 0.073 
 
FLOUR MILLS 0.192 8.964 0.992 0.969 0.512 0.457 7.924 0.281 
 
NORTH. NIG. FLOUR 0.082 2.461 0.626 0.590 0.020 0.570 6.662 -0.018 
 
NAT. SALT CO. OF NIG. -0.053 -0.037 1.498 1.071 0.378 0.693 4.498 0.078 
 
NESTLE 0.449 26.360 0.684 0.667 0.249 0.418 7.522 0.340 
 
NIG. BOTTLING CO 0.097 6.874 0.856 0.841 0.493 0.348 7.735 0.241 
 
TANTALIZERS 0.089 16.891 0.923 0.837 0.456 0.381 6.493 0.160 
 
UTC NIG. PLC -0.133 -0.193 1.089 0.552 0.144 0.408 6.081 -0.394 
 
FIDSON HEALTHCARE 0.245 3.403 0.256 0.174 0.055 0.119 6.198 0.089 
 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE 0.183 2.912 0.619 0.556 0.086 0.470 6.911 0.303 
 
MAY and BAKER 0.130 1.240 0.312 0.206 0.145 0.061 6.354 0.343 
 
MORRISON IND. 0.070 0.290 0.655 0.419 0.103 0.316 5.280 0.586 
 
NEIMETH 0.094 0.831 0.466 0.335 0.242 0.093 6.128 0.353 
 
CAPITAL HOTELS 0.086 0.227 0.769 0.375 0.235 0.140 6.391 0.321 
 
IKEJA HOTEL 0.107 1.168 0.760 0.659 0.088 0.571 6.604 0.309 
 
THE TOURIST CO. -0.003 -0.037 0.994 0.894 0.360 0.534 6.057 -0.166 
 
ALEX IND. PLC 0.013 0.065 1.294 0.897 0.696 0.201 5.854 0.000 
 
B.O.C GASES 0.270 0.744 0.945 0.589 0.169 0.420 6.012 0.262 
 
FIRST ALUMINIUM 0.047 0.087 1.033 0.741 0.244 0.498 6.856 0.232 
 
NIG. ENAMELWARE 0.224 2.188 0.561 0.456 0.304 0.152 6.221 0.344 
 
VITAFOAM NIG. PLC 0.178 1.936 0.574 0.468 0.116 0.353 6.680 0.393 
 
CHAMS PLC 0.136 221.828 1.085 0.994 0.190 0.804 5.681 0.085 
 
STARCOMMS -0.178 -47.261 1.288 1.272 0.786 0.486 6.892 0.036 
 
STOKVIS NIG. PLC -0.055 -1.077 0.897 0.850 0.305 0.545 2.356 -0.020 
 
JAPAUL OIL 0.164 19.025 0.532 0.286 0.155 0.131 5.914 0.165 
 
DAAR COMM. -0.023 0.005 0.306 0.146 0.004 0.142 6.071 -0.606 
 
AVON 0.054 0.785 0.739 0.668 0.053 0.615 6.757 0.388 
 
BETA GLASS 0.169 2.377 0.684 0.599 0.222 0.377 6.751 0.262 
 
GREIF NIG. PLC -0.142 -2.273 0.274 0.213 0.047 0.166 5.706 2.729 
 
NAMPAK NIG. PLC 0.139 1.072 0.266 0.132 0.102 0.030 6.349 0.354 
 
NIG. BAG. MANU. CO. 0.083 3.892 0.998 0.921 0.617 0.304 6.933 0.441 
 
POLY PRODUCTS 0.053 0.185 0.737 0.450 0.032 0.418 6.148 1.235 
 
STUDIO PRESS 0.026 0.753 0.875 0.832 0.598 0.235 5.823 0.219 
 
WEST AFRICAN GLASS -0.059 -1.099 1.234 1.166 0.236 0.930 6.115 -0.012 
 
AP PLC 0.187 5.347 2.140 2.106 0.415 1.692 7.771 0.101 
 
AFROIL -0.101 -0.359 1.058 0.654 0.495 0.159 0.967 -0.095 
 
CHEVRON 0.102 14.097 0.820 0.813 0.060 0.752 7.707 0.360 
 
CONOIL 0.322 10.805 0.234 0.204 0.087 0.117 7.818 0.324 
 
ETERNA OIL -0.459 -1.286 1.334 0.919 0.087 0.833 6.069 -0.051 
 
MOBIL 0.369 19.708 0.727 0.709 0.261 0.447 7.677 0.282 
 
OANDO 0.066 7.393 0.327 0.317 0.124 0.194 8.012 0.224 
 
TOTAL NIG PLC 0.519 26.323 0.485 0.466 0.277 0.189 8.029 0.313 
 
ACADEMY PRESS 0.222 0.823 0.647 0.355 0.155 0.200 6.003 0.306 
 
LONGMAN 0.370 2.601 0.425 0.255 0.087 0.168 6.129 0.359 
 
UNIVERSITY PRESS 0.151 1.414 0.477 0.367 0.034 0.334 5.730 0.331 
 
UACN PROPERTY 0.037 2.068 0.440 0.422 0.013 0.409 6.654 0.232 
 
ASSOCIATED BUS 0.127 2.587 0.592 0.480 0.197 0.283 6.336 0.322 
 
UNITED NIG. TEXTILES -0.040 -1.012 0.301 0.267 0.051 0.216 7.304 -0.287 
 
          
MINIMUM -0.921 -47.261 0.149 0.067 0.004 0.005 0.967 -0.606 
 




Standard deviation Firm 
 
  
ROA ROE Tob  TDTA LTDTA STDTA SIZE TAX 
AFPRINT 
 
0.021 0.272 0.165 0.139 0.051 0.171 0.022 0.147 
ELLAH LAKES PLC 0.002 12.755 0.113 0.167 0.098 0.070 0.170 0.129 
LIVESTOCK 
 
1.103 28.637 1.191 1.365 0.067 1.306 0.114 1.042 
OKITIPUPA 
 
0.018 0.189 1.734 1.625 0.585 1.359 2.125 0.164 
OKOMU 
 
0.049 1.398 0.081 0.079 0.076 0.045 0.045 0.021 
PRESCO 
 
0.028 0.377 0.096 0.096 0.034 0.067 0.020 0.141 
AIRLINE SER 
 
0.095 2.783 0.114 0.165 0.213 0.148 0.269 0.031 
NAHCO 
 
0.076 1.008 0.127 0.135 0.155 0.250 0.084 0.077 
DUNLOP 
 
0.039 0.390 0.146 0.171 0.158 0.050 0.030 0.095 
INCAR 
 
0.122 0.440 0.698 0.595 0.058 0.587 0.082 0.782 
R.T. BRISCO 
 
0.121 1.784 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.009 0.220 0.094 
GUINNESS 
 
0.072 5.493 0.080 0.079 0.075 0.006 0.071 0.044 
INT BREWERIES 0.163 0.293 0.737 0.760 0.377 0.470 0.101 0.000 
JOS INT BREW 
 
1.140 2.723 1.799 1.713 0.240 1.658 0.138 0.135 
NIGERIAN BREW 0.101 1.753 0.060 0.063 0.022 0.083 0.082 0.045 
ASHAKA CEM 
 
0.176 2.549 0.016 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.119 0.169 
BENUE CEMENT 0.220 4.661 0.413 0.401 0.077 0.472 2.776 0.178 
CEM. CO. NORTH 0.067 0.689 0.095 0.094 0.021 0.095 0.127 1.004 
LAFARGE WAPCO 0.229 5.149 0.549 0.550 0.309 0.275 0.182 0.036 
NIGERIAN ROPES 0.017 0.054 0.037 0.034 0.030 0.016 0.039 0.116 
NIGERIAN WIRE 0.068 2.132 0.212 0.134 0.042 0.132 0.086 0.338 
BERGER PAINTS 0.128 0.906 0.062 0.058 0.027 0.074 0.042 0.292 
CHEM and ALLIED 0.068 1.131 0.038 0.020 0.020 0.001 0.089 0.036 
DN MEYER PLC 0.418 1.118 0.293 0.187 0.171 0.052 0.071 0.149 
IPWA 
 
0.138 0.261 0.716 0.634 0.518 0.267 0.113 0.037 
NIG-GERMAN CHEM 0.019 0.463 0.071 0.081 0.093 0.015 0.079 0.075 
PREMIER PAINTS 0.074 0.588 1.453 1.461 0.016 1.461 0.054 1.190 
NAT. SPORTS LOTTERY 0.375 0.730 2.029 2.093 1.027 1.068 2.382 0.000 
RED STAR 
 
0.190 2.779 0.122 0.043 0.045 0.009 0.094 0.063 
TRANS-NAT. EXPRESS 0.205 0.361 0.375 0.393 0.101 0.334 0.201 0.099 
NCR NIGERIA PLC 2.565 4.780 2.292 2.347 2.402 0.216 0.312 0.348 
OMATEK 
 
0.033 1.723 0.056 0.055 0.133 0.112 0.128 0.000 
THOMAS WYATT 0.175 1.250 0.522 0.555 0.020 0.559 0.249 0.471 
TRIPPLE GEE 
 
0.030 0.213 0.125 0.122 0.042 0.145 0.122 0.043 
A.G. LEVENTIS 0.023 0.201 0.041 0.018 0.014 0.010 0.044 0.049 
CHELLARAMS 
 
0.012 0.067 0.040 0.035 0.021 0.018 0.128 0.182 
JOHN HOLT 
 
0.061 1.084 0.043 0.047 0.005 0.048 0.096 0.559 
P.Z. CUSSONS 
 
0.012 0.177 0.021 0.019 0.016 0.005 0.134 0.037 
SCOA 
 
1.374 1.001 1.351 0.884 0.088 0.797 0.158 0.120 
UAC 
 
0.027 0.026 0.075 0.115 0.066 0.052 0.060 0.037 
UNILEVER 
 
0.094 0.113 0.448 0.380 0.030 0.398 0.095 0.034 
CAPPA and D'ALBERTO 0.143 3.432 2.157 2.155 0.066 2.118 0.155 0.208 
COSTAIN WEST AFR. 0.537 8.036 0.605 0.592 0.335 0.448 0.208 0.007 
JULIUS BERGER 0.024 5.839 0.098 0.104 0.064 0.166 0.164 0.027 
ROADS NIGERIA PLC 0.102 1.438 0.156 0.162 0.306 0.179 0.322 1.735 
ADSWITCH PLC 0.233 0.397 0.099 0.069 0.023 0.065 0.207 0.479 
CAPITAL OIL 
 
0.031 0.085 0.320 0.214 0.026 0.191 0.141 0.493 
JULI PLC 
 
0.071 0.103 0.170 0.086 0.083 0.081 0.149 0.488 
SMART PRODUCTS 0.032 0.139 0.190 0.206 0.159 0.091 0.409 0.211 
CUTIX PLC 
 
0.100 0.289 0.115 0.033 0.050 0.048 0.174 0.077 
INTERLINKED TECH 1.079 0.764 0.687 0.446 0.152 0.447 0.287 0.402 
7-UP BOTTLING CO. 0.112 0.831 0.086 0.095 0.102 0.015 0.107 0.029 
BIG TREAT PLC 0.038 0.081 0.346 0.477 0.234 0.244 0.597 0.190 
CADBURY NIG. PLC 0.312 9.396 0.670 0.673 0.158 0.532 0.067 0.248 
FLOUR MILLS 
 
0.066 3.880 0.603 0.605 0.199 0.418 0.135 0.040 
NORTH. NIG. FLOUR 0.077 2.413 0.057 0.054 0.006 0.049 0.054 0.552 
NAT. SALT CO. OF NIG. 0.198 0.590 0.320 0.218 0.197 0.178 1.164 0.156 
NESTLE 
 
0.032 3.568 0.022 0.023 0.044 0.026 0.090 0.018 
NIG. BOTTLING CO 0.045 3.090 0.009 0.009 0.049 0.055 0.069 0.086 
TANTALIZERS 
 
0.035 12.512 0.397 0.413 0.121 0.341 0.092 0.079 
UTC NIG. PLC 
 
0.233 0.289 0.386 0.229 0.032 0.234 0.179 0.604 
FIDSON HEALTHCARE 0.036 1.493 0.289 0.261 0.020 0.243 0.250 0.087 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE 0.033 0.325 0.059 0.051 0.012 0.049 0.097 0.028 
MAY and BAKER 0.030 0.268 0.107 0.124 0.123 0.023 0.121 0.096 
MORRISON IND. 0.028 0.077 0.076 0.105 0.013 0.092 0.057 0.341 
NEIMETH 
 
0.031 0.481 0.122 0.158 0.173 0.029 0.098 0.028 
CAPITAL HOTELS 0.061 0.167 0.095 0.115 0.010 0.108 0.059 0.002 
IKEJA HOTEL 
 
0.094 0.323 0.219 0.318 0.060 0.297 0.088 0.079 
THE TOURIST CO. 0.027 0.290 0.283 0.292 0.030 0.266 0.062 0.556 
ALEX IND. PLC 0.108 0.279 0.122 0.080 0.255 0.191 0.139 0.000 
B.O.C GASES 
 
0.092 0.156 0.262 0.327 0.120 0.227 0.068 0.105 
FIRST ALUMINIUM 0.083 0.321 0.730 0.799 0.249 0.736 0.099 0.364 
NIG. ENAMELWARE 0.014 0.325 0.256 0.254 0.216 0.124 0.024 0.057 
VITAFOAM NIG. PLC 0.045 0.826 0.215 0.197 0.039 0.180 0.145 0.336 
CHAMS PLC 
 
0.277 738.449 0.992 1.053 0.256 0.810 0.590 0.089 
STARCOMMS 
 
0.119 25.143 0.255 0.276 0.262 0.178 0.293 0.630 
STOKVIS NIG. PLC 0.082 1.734 0.123 0.117 0.019 0.101 1.228 0.098 
JAPAUL OIL 
 
0.010 36.905 0.219 0.198 0.206 0.072 0.290 0.059 
DAAR COMM. 
 
0.062 0.256 0.148 0.076 0.001 0.075 0.235 0.866 
AVON 
 
0.009 0.176 0.032 0.038 0.018 0.038 0.066 0.113 
BETA GLASS 
 
0.116 1.498 0.202 0.169 0.087 0.132 0.057 0.143 
GREIF NIG. PLC 0.127 2.022 0.104 0.100 0.022 0.092 0.066 6.110 
NAMPAK NIG. PLC 0.050 0.445 0.048 0.062 0.053 0.022 0.091 0.182 
NIG. BAG. MANU. CO. 0.061 4.289 0.198 0.249 0.237 0.066 0.130 0.324 
POLY PRODUCTS 0.031 0.109 0.029 0.048 0.014 0.044 0.056 1.302 
STUDIO PRESS 
 
0.009 0.420 0.344 0.352 0.266 0.117 0.323 0.145 
WEST AFRICAN GLASS 0.073 1.418 0.388 0.400 0.440 0.080 0.051 0.059 
AP PLC 
 
0.340 8.393 2.397 2.400 0.410 1.992 0.174 0.084 
AFROIL 
 
0.042 0.201 0.616 0.361 0.329 0.083 1.934 0.009 
CHEVRON 
 
0.031 5.330 0.021 0.022 0.010 0.030 0.126 0.040 
CONOIL 
 
0.048 0.703 0.033 0.035 0.031 0.013 0.153 0.012 
ETERNA OIL 
 
0.477 1.412 0.340 0.263 0.033 0.273 0.533 0.180 
MOBIL 
 
0.117 4.753 0.155 0.154 0.037 0.186 0.058 0.087 
OANDO 
 
0.020 2.436 0.215 0.216 0.069 0.166 0.125 0.085 
TOTAL NIG PLC 0.148 3.692 0.058 0.059 0.021 0.058 0.116 0.065 
ACADEMY PRESS 0.058 0.304 0.085 0.108 0.124 0.032 0.115 0.125 
LONGMAN 
 
0.123 1.546 0.245 0.255 0.028 0.247 0.162 0.057 
UNIVERSITY PRESS 0.040 0.498 0.029 0.035 0.012 0.025 0.170 0.016 
UACN PROPERTY 0.011 0.448 0.095 0.101 0.006 0.105 0.088 0.069 
ASSOCIATED BUS 0.062 2.310 0.117 0.022 0.136 0.152 0.121 0.100 
UNITED NIG. TEXTILES 0.083 2.160 0.043 0.042 0.008 0.036 0.041 1.191 
          
MINIMUM 
 
0.002 0.026 0.009 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.020 0.000 
MAXIMUM 
 
2.565 738.449 2.397 2.400 2.402 2.118 2.776 6.110 
    Note: ROA is the return on assets (EBIT/ total assets), ROE is the return on equity (EBIT/ equity), Tob Q (Tobins Q) =( Market value of equity + book 
value of debt)/ book value of assets; TDTA is the total debt divided/ total assets; LTDTA is the long-term debt / total assets; STDTA is the short-term 
debt/total assets; Size represented as log of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). Leverage is TDTA, LTDTA or STDTA 
 
7. Theories and empirical relations between leverage and firm performance 
Variables Predicted signs by the theory Modal 
empiricalevidence 
reported in the 
literatures 
Some Empirical Evidence 
ROA - (pecking order, agency costs) 
 
+ (trade-off, signalling) 
- 
Shyam-sunder &Myers (1999), 
Fama & French (2002) 
Graham & Harvey (2001) 
ROE - (pecking order, agency costs) 
 
+ (trade-off, signalling) 
- 
Chen (2004), Krishnan & 
Moyer (1997), Tian &Zeitun 
(2007) 
Size - (pecking order) 
 
+ (trade-off, signalling) 
+ Rajan & Zingales (1995), Tian & 
Zeitun (2007), Gleason et al. 
(2000). 
Tax - (pecking order) 
+ (trade-off, signalling) 
+ Krishnan & Moyer (1997), 
Tian & Zeitun (2007) 
Source: Olokoyo (2012) and Kebewar (2013) 
 
8.  Addition of industry dummies to control for potential industry effects, Olokoyo (2012) 
 
 TDTA  LTDTA  STDTA  




































































































































































































































































































































































































































No. of Observations 505 505 505 505 505 505 
R-Square 0.1782 0.9697 0.3048 0.5367 0.0908 0.7589 
F-Stat 3.5539 525.13 7.1825 13.5146 1.6375 51.5730 
       
Note: *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level and * Significant at 10% level. The source of this result is Olokoyo (2012). Estimation was 
done using the random effects model. The Hansen (1999) could not be applied with industry dummies because it is based on the fixed effect model 
that has limited application when variables have values that mostly do not change across both time and units, violating a requirement of the Hansel 
(1999) model which requires variables have values that vary with time for the purposes of identification. The industry dummies do not change over 
time and thus not reported in a model based on fixed effects. Numbers in parentheses are the asymptotic t- values of the co-efficient. ROA = the 
return on assets (EBIT/ total assets); Tob Q (Tobinഺs Q) = Market value of equity + book value of debt/book value of assets; TDTA = total debt divided 
by total assets; LTDTA = long-term debt divided by total assets; STDTA = short term debt divided by total assets; Size = log of turnover, Tax = total 
tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), Dum refers to the dummy variables for industry, Leverage refers to TDTA, LTDTAs or STDTAs. 
